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Chomsky and others have denied the relevance of external linguistic 
entities, such as E-languages, to linguistic explanation, and have 
questioned their coherence altogether.  I discuss a new approach to 
understanding the nature of linguistic entities, focusing in particular on 
making sense of the varieties of kinds of “words” that are employed in 
linguistic theorizing.  This treatment of linguistic entities in general is 
applied to constructing an understanding of external linguistic entities. 
 
In a recent interview Peter Ludlow conducted with Chomsky, Chomsky 
mentions B.F. Skinner’s work with pigeons to illustrate his views on 
internalist explanation.  The science of pigeon psychology, Chomsky asserts, 
is a matter of understanding strictly the internal states and pathways of the 
pigeon’s mind, including how those pathways react when they receive signals 
or impressions of various kinds.  A scientist who wants to carry out the 
program of understanding a pigeon, Chomsky says, will in the end forget 
about the external environment in which the pigeon is embedded, but will 
investigate “what’s going on in the pigeon’s head on the occasion of sense.”1  
Similarly, it is unnecessary, unscientific, and probably incoherent to look 
outside the mind of the individual for explanations of the workings of 
language for that individual, on Chomsky’s view. 
* My thanks to audiences at the 2007 Dubrovnik Workshop on the Philosophy of 
Linguistics and at Virginia Tech, and for an ITSG grant from Virginia Tech CLAHS. 
1 Chomsky and Ludlow (2003) 
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Interestingly, even in his brief discussion of the pigeon experiment, 
Chomsky attacks Skinner in two different ways.  His main criticism does not 
actually address internalism, but rather, it is criticism of Skinner on what we 
might call the “ontology of pigeon psychology.”  He asserts, presumably 
correctly, that Skinner mistakenly categorizes the pigeon behaviors he 
observes as “bar-pressings,” when Skinner gets the pigeons to peck at bars in 
response to various stimuli.  As Chomsky notes, what the pigeons are doing 
actually ought to be divided into two kinds of pecking categories, 
corresponding to two different instinctual behaviors: pecking for water, and 
pecking for a seed.  In the pigeon brain, those involve different pathways, and 
a shortcoming of Skinner’s experiment is that it fails to distinguish these. 
What is interesting about his criticism of Skinner, of course, is that it 
invokes features of the outside world, namely, seeds and water.  Now, 
Chomsky immediately goes on to say that pigeon psychology ought to focus 
on the internals and forget about the seeds and the water; but at least for this 
moment in the analysis of the psychological pathways of the pigeon, it seems 
that the seeds and the water play an explanatory role. 
 Most attacks on Chomsky’s internalism, and his claims of the 
irrelevance of public language to linguistic explanation, have largely focused 
on the individuation of linguistic entities and properties.  Semantic 
externalists have argued that certain if not all mental states are externally 
individuated, and teleofunctional accounts of certain linguistic entities have 
recently provided a concrete story of how such individuation might go.  
Inasmuch as linguistics traffics in externally individuated entities, it cannot be 
exhausted by an investigation of internal psychology.  Externalist attacks are 
the ones that Ludlow addresses in detail in chapter 4 of his forthcoming book, 
and equally the metaphysics of linguistic entities is the topic that occupies 
much discussion of Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of Language and in recent 
work by Georges Rey on the existence of standard linguistic entities.2 
In this paper I wish to pursue a different avenue to vindicating the role of 
2 Devitt (2006); Rey (2006b); Rey (2006a); Ludlow (2007). 
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external entities in linguistic theory.  My intention here is to put off the 
questions of externalism, in the interest first of arguing for the role of external 
entities in linguistic explanation.  It is not accidental that the seeds and water 
are involved in the explanation involving the pigeon, nor, I shall argue, will it 
be the case that in an ideal or future science of linguistics, to say nothing of 
the actual one, that external factors will justifiably be excluded from 
linguistic explanation. 
A critical issue that has, I believe, made the role of external entities in 
linguistic theory difficult to treat, notwithstanding many efforts to do so, is 
the focus on E-language as the primary entity of concern.  This choice has 
weighed the conclusions against the sensible construal of external linguistic 
entities.  Even though I will argue that external linguistic entities are quite 
prevalent in linguistic explanation, it is in fact little surprise that we cannot 
find many uses for E-language per se in the details of specific elements of 
linguistic explanation.  Because, in fact, we also do not have much use for I-
language per se in the elements of a theory either.  In the details of any 
theory, the system as a whole rarely figures into theoretical explanations, any 
more than cells as a whole figure into explanations of organelles, or bodies in 
explanations of the structures of anatomical parts.  Rather, I will reframe the 
discussion of external factors in terms of the linguistic entities, internal and 
external, that are commonly used in linguistic explanations.  The entities I 
will focus on in this case are words of various kinds, which I will roughly 
distinguish into I-words and E-words. 
1. Varieties of words 
There is a small philosophical literature and a large linguistic literature on 
the nature of words.  Philosophical treatments of the metaphysics of words 
have generally arisen in the context either of controversies over the 
type/token distinction or controversies over the modal status of T-sentences.  
A few proposals were made a number of years ago about the nature of words, 
including Devitt’s suggestion in Designation that words are temporally 
extended and causally connected sets of physical tokens, Millikan’s treatment 
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of words as reproductively established families, and Bromberger’s account of 
words as linguistic types3.  Somewhat more recently David Kaplan stimulated 
renewed discussion of the topic with an article proposing a theory of words in 
the interest of solving Kripke’s puzzle about belief.4  The linguistics literature 
has had different concerns entirely.  The most sustained treatment of words is 
probably Di Sciullo and Williams’ monograph On the Definition of Word,5 
but the topic is widely discussed in many subfields of linguistics.  Naturally, 
theories of the lexicon are concerned with the nature of words, but also most 
books on morphology have at least a chapter on the nature of the word, and in 
phonology as well there has recently been a flurry of activity on 
interpretations of the “phonological word.” 
Most conspicuous in all this material is just how many different senses 
‘word’ has.  Here I want to start by clarifying the different kinds of word in 
these many contexts, but I want to do so with an eye to noticing and taking on 
the burden of explaining the relations among these as well.  It is conceivable 
that a word like ‘word’ can come to refer to a number of different phenomena 
that are only superficially similar to one another, but it is also entirely 
reasonable to ask whether there is not a unifying explanation for that 
similarity. 
Philosophical treatments of words 
First, let me point out a couple of ways in which philosophers have taken 
‘word’ to be ambiguous.  Most obvious is the type-token ambiguity.  In 
counting words, as Quine pointed out, we tend to count tokens in certain 
contexts and types in others.6  We say that there are eight words in an 
inscription of the phrase, “A rose is a rose is a rose,” but if we are counting 
the number of words in a child’s vocabulary, we do not count ‘rose’ more 
3 Devitt (1981); Millikan (1984); Bromberger (1989). 
4 Kaplan (1990) 
5 Di Sciullo and Williams (1987) 
66 Quine (1987); Szabo (1999). 
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than once, regardless of the number of times the child utters or thinks it. 
Another ambiguity brought out by the recent work on the metaphysics of 
words involves the role of semantic value in individuating words.  Intuitively, 
homonyms like ‘bank’ and ‘bank’ are different words, though they have the 
same orthography and pronunciation.  A simple way of explaining this 
intuition is to take a word’s semantic value to be an essential property of the 
word, so that homonyms are different words in virtue of having different 
semantic values. A different perspective on this “semantic essentialism,” 
however, has arisen from the literature on deflationary theories of truth.  If the 
semantic value of a word is an essential property of that word, that seems to 
imply that T-sentences (e.g., “‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
white.”) are necessary, rather than contingent.  This is a consequence that 
many philosophers have disliked;7 consequently, in recent discussions of 
words most philosophers have assumed that semantic essentialism is false.8  
There is thus a potential divergence between an intuitive sense of ‘word’, in 
which semantic value figures into their individuation, versus a sense in which 
‘word’ refers only to the sign, independent of semantic value.  This point 
remains in dispute. 
Whichever metaphysical line is advanced in philosophical treatments of 
words, however, there is one conspicuous piece of common ground: the 
primary instances of words about which these theories are constructed are not 
mental tokens.  Some theories, such as Kaplan’s, do include mental factors in 
their accounts of word-individuation, but mainly these are theories of 
utterances and inscriptions, i.e., entities that have tokens or stages that are 
physical and largely external to individuals.  This is in contrast to the variety 
7 Cf. Field (1994); Soames (1995); Price (1997); Garcia-Carpintero (1997). 
8 This is explicitly argued by Herman Cappelen, in a recent attack on stage-continuant 
pictures of words (Cappelen (1999)), such as those advanced by Devitt, Millikan, 
Kaplan, and Mark Richard (Richard (1990)).  But many of these continuant pictures of 
words also distance themselves from semantic essentialism.  In “Words,” Kaplan 
intends to give an account of the difference between ‘bank’ and ‘bank’ as different 
“lexico-syntactic entities.”  This also seems to be the approach taken by Szabo in his 
recent “representation” theory of words (Szabo (1999)). 
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of ways ‘word’ is treated in linguistics. 
Linguistic treatments of words 
For any given architecture of the language faculty, there are plausibly a 
number of senses of ‘word’. A major complication for disambiguating the 
senses of ‘word’ in linguistics is that there is far from a consensus on 
linguistic architecture, with each approach expanding or collapsing the 
distinctions that others make.9  The best known distinction between kinds of 
words in linguistics is typically drawn between the listed items, which Di 
Sciullo and Williams call “listemes,” and the syntactic words, which they call 
“syntactic atoms.”  These they understand to be the items that are opaque to 
syntactic manipulation, the items that can be placed in X0 positions in 
syntactic structures.  In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Chomsky uses 
‘lexicon’ to mean the repository of all the words the speaker knows, and he 
does not pay much attention to larger and smaller units that have to be 
stored.10  But it is clear that the distinction needs to be made.  Idioms suffice 
to illustrate this, since the meaning of idioms cannot be derived from their 
parts, and yet they are not opaque to syntactic rules.  For example: 
(1) a. He dragged Michael’s name through the mud. 
b. Michael’s name was dragged through the mud by him. 
c. *He Michael’s dragged name through the mud. 
Di Sciullo and Williams argue that a further distinction needs to be made 
between not just syntactic words and listemes, but also syntactic words and 
morphological words, or what they call “morphological objects.”  The 
distinction between these is more complicated, since the boundaries of 
9 In light of the continual flux of views on linguistic architectures, it is almost surprising 
that we can even purport to talk about “standard linguistic entities,” since there is no 
standard or consensus about what even the basic categories of entities there are.  To be 
sure, linguistic theory constantly makes use of a wide variety of entities or constituents, 
many of which have been part of linguistic theorizing for generations.  At the same 
time, however, what linguistic entities there are depends on how the divisions are made 
among components of the language faculty.  This is a particular problem for words. 
10 Chomsky (1965); Cf. Jackendoff (2002), p. 153. 
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morphology are more in dispute, but some simple examples show this 
distinction too to be very plausible. 
First, it has long been noticed that a distinction must be made between 
listemes and morphological objects.  Halle (1973) notes that word generation 
is productive, as in: 
(2) missile, anti-missile missile, anti-anti-missile missile missile. 
To distinguish morphological words from syntactic words, Di Sciullo and 
Williams give the example of romance compounds such as essuie-glace 
‘windshield wiper’.  Many romance compounds are opaque to syntactic rules, 
and thus act as syntactic atoms.  For instance: 
(3)  a. un bon essuie-glace 
b. trois essuie-glace 
c. Ils ont fait l’amour comme des essuie-glace. 
 d. *essuie-bien glace 
e. *essuie-quelques-glaces 
f. *essuient-glace 
The compound essuie-glace in this way is different from the compound 
timbre-poste, which seems to act more like an idiom or listed phrase, and is 
not syntactically opaque.11 
Other examples of romance compounds that are syntactically opaque are: 
(4) a. trompe-l’oeil, fend-la-bise, coupe-la-soif 
 b. boit-sans-soif, pince-sans-rire, monte-en-l’air 
 c. bon-à-rien, haut-de-forme, juste-au-corps 
 d. home-de-paille, boule-de-neige, arc-en-ciel 
 e. hors-la-loi, sans-le-sous, hors-d’oeuvre 
Although these are syntactic words (on the opacity interpretation), 
nonetheless there is good reason not to take them to be morphological words.  
As Di Sciullo and Williams say, “if morphology were enriched to generate 
these directly, not only would the generality of morphological principles be 
compromised but the fact that all the examples are compatible with the laws 
11  One difference between essuie-glace and timbre-poste is that the latter is head-initial. 
7 
 
                                                 
of French syntactic form would be missed.”12 
A fourth variety of word in linguistic theory is that of a phonological or 
prosodic word, or “pword”, defined within the phonology component (and 
denoted by ω).  Phonological words are an element of the phonological 
hierarchy, typically understood potentially to include utterances, intonational 
phrases, phonological phrases, phonological words, feet, syllables, moras, 
segments, and features.13 
There is a good deal of evidence that the phonological words are an 
explanatory kind in phonological theory, but there is controversy over what 
the criteria for pword boundaries are.  T. Alan Hall has recently reviewed 
three sets of considerations arguing for the role of the pword in phonological 
generalizations: its playing a role in the domain of phonological rules, in 
phonotactic generalizations, and for minimality constraints.14  Booij (1984) 
and Nespor and Vogel (1986), for instance, argue that the explanation of 
Hungarian vowel harmony applies only when the trigger and target occur in 
the same pword.  For phonotactic constraints, Booij (1999) and Hall (1999b) 
argue that in German and Dutch, there are constraints barring some sound or 
sequence of sounds occurring at the beginning or end of a pword. 
Nevertheless, the criteria for pword boundaries are still in flux.  Aronoff 
and Sridhar (1983) argue that stress patterns are the main criterion for 
pwords, for instance, while Raffelsiefen (1999) argues that pword boundaries 
depend on other elements of the prosodic hierarchy, i.e., syllable, mora, and 
foot. 
Many linguists see the pword as involved in the interface between 
morphology and phonology, and assume that there is a connection between 
pword boundaries and morphological boundaries.  Nonetheless, the pword 
differs from both the morphological word and the syntactic word.  Szpyra 
(1989), for instance, employs a distinction between two different kinds of 
12 Di Sciullo and Williams (1987), p. 83. 
13 Cf. Selkirk (1984). 
14 Hall (1999a) 
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affixes to distinguish those that are incorporated in the pword of the stem to 
which they attach from those that do not, such as: 
(5) a. im+polite   (impolite)ω 
 b. un+believable  (un) ω (believable) ω 
Nonetheless, there may be limitations to the mismatch.  Nespor and 
Vogel (1986) have argued that pwords cannot span two grammatical words, 
but others have argued that they can.  For instance, in the phrase: 
(6) I’ll cross the street. 
Di Sciullo and Williams argue that ‘I’ll’ is a phonological word, but it is not a 
word in any other sense.  It is not a syntactic atom, since clearly the position 
of ‘I’ll’ in the sentence is determined by the syntactic distribution of I and 
will, and hence is composed of syntactically accessible parts.15 
Clearly, all these distinctions are controversial, and in this discussion I do 
not intend to evaluate or endorse these particular distinctions or ways of 
characterizing them.  In fact, when we step back and consider them as a 
group, there are some peculiarities about how they are specified.  
Morphological words seem to be determined through the characteristics of the 
interface between morphology and other components, while phonological 
words are simply entities that play a role in one layer of the phonology 
component, and have an unclear relation to the interfaces with other units.  
Syntactic words also seem to be defined in terms of a role, but are defined 
through a single theoretical criterion, i.e. opacity to syntactic rules.  It would 
not be inconsistent for all these characterizations to hold, but we can surmise 
that we have not yet arrived at a stable ontology in the theories of every one 
of these components. 
A natural reaction is that given all this ambiguity, we might ask whether it 
even makes sense to speak of words in the first place, as opposed simply to 
introducing several different entities playing different roles.  Indeed, these 
different uses of word need to be disambiguated, and kept track of.  
Moreover, even apart from the issue of the many kinds of words, some 
15 Di Sciullo and Williams (1987), p. 107. 
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linguists are skeptical that it is even coherent to speak of words within a 
linguistic component.  A number of theories of syntax weaken or deny the 
distinction between syntax and morphology, and take morphemes to be the 
primary unit of syntactic operations.  Marit Julien, for instance, has recently 
argued that words are not grammatical entities at all, but rather are a kind of 
linguistic epiphenomenon arising from distributional regularities in 
expressions constructed of morphemes.16 
In linguistics we thus have two grounds for being skeptical of a single 
coherent notion of “word”: the ambiguity of the notion across linguistic 
components, and the difficulty of delineating it even when limited to a single 
component. 
I will suggest that these two issues are related to one another, and that we 
can illuminate the nature of words within a component by considering their 
role in the language faculty altogether, that is, how the kinds of word-like 
entities in one linguistic component are related to those in another.  Before we 
examine whether or how there can be unity in their differences, let us start 
with a way of keeping track of entities in linguistic components.  We will see 
that there actually are far more than the four or six varieties I have mentioned. 
2. Keeping track of linguistic entities 
Ramsey-Lewis sentences are a useful device for characterizing and 
keeping track of the differences among linguistic kinds.17  As I will explain, I 
will use the sentences simply as characterizations of terms referring to these 
kinds.  
To apply these sentences to linguistic kinds, consider the phonological 
word.  While there may be an economical explicit definition of the 
phonological word, it is helpful to characterize it by means of a theory of the 
phonological component.  A full theory of the universals of the phonological 
component will have clauses involving all the elements of the phonological 
16 Julien (2007). 
17 Cf. Lewis (1970); Lewis (1972); Lewis (1997). 
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hierarchy.  For reasons I will talk about shortly, I will use the notation B  to 
denote the components as typically treated in linguistics, and T  to denote the 
typical theories (B and T without the bars will show up below).  For the 
universal aspect of the phonology component, as typically treated by 
linguistics, I will use the notation BPU , and for a good theory of BPU  I will 
use the notation T PU . 
Let us take as a simplified theory of phonology the following fragment, 
given by Jackendoff (2002) based on Selkirk (1984): 
(7) A version of T PU : 
a. An utterance consists of a series of one or more 
concatenated intonational phrases forming a flat structure. 
b. Each intonational phrase is a sequence of phonological 
words. 
c. Preferably, the intonational phrases are of equal length. 
d. Preferably, the longest intonational phrase is at the end. 
e. Possibly, there is a maximum duration for intonational 
phrases 
f. Etc. 
Suppose that there are n theoretical terms in T PU , and the term 
‘phonological word’ is the ith term among those n terms.  Then the Ramsey-
Lewis definition of the ith term is given by the description: 
(8) Di(T) =def ℩yi∃y1…yi-1yi+1…yn∀x1xn (T[x1,…,xn] ↔ 
y1=x1∧…∧yn=xn) 
where T[ ] is the sentence obtained by conjoining the clauses of T PU  and 
replacing the n theoretical terms in T PU  with free variables x1,…,xn. 18 
18 Lewis (1970), p. 88. 
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Ramsey-Lewis descriptions are most familiar in now-outdated 
functionalist theories of mind, so let me say a couple of words about my use 
of these descriptions.  When a philosopher of mind characterizes a functional 
property with a Ramsey-Lewis description, she will often intend to suggest 
that the description exhausts the property, that the property is strictly 
functional and can be realized by any physical substrate satisfying the 
function.  That is not the suggestion here. 
The problem we have in speaking of linguistic entities is that even if we 
are realists about these entities, it is a big task simply to designate which 
entities we are speaking of.  A theory of a highly complex system, such as of 
the language faculty, will involve terms referring to the “natural” kinds or 
entities in that system.  But it is an illusion to suppose that there is a sharp 
distinction, in any special science, between the “natural” kinds and the non-
natural ones.  Rather, in linguistics as in other special sciences, we construct 
theories based on the most privileged or “quasi-natural” entities and kinds, 
those that give rise to the phenomena of concern, and that are involved in 
relevant explanations, in the science. 
In a domain in which there are many candidate entities, as in the 
candidates for “words” in the language faculty, we therefore need a device for 
designating which quasi-natural one we are referring to with a particular term.  
This is where Ramsey-Lewis descriptions are useful.  These descriptions 
allow us to designate entities using a theory as a whole, i.e., to take an 
implicitly described entity and construct an explicit description, presuming 
that a good theory employs just the most natural or privileged entities.  That 
does not, however, imply any particular view on the metaphysics of linguistic 
entities.19  To be sure, I do not employ Ramsey-Lewis descriptions to suggest 
19 If we are realists about linguistic kinds, then there will be true theories of the 
components in which the kinds play a role.  A realist might say, with early David 
Lewis, that the terms are implicitly defined in the theory, and we hope that a true 
theory we construct will be uniquely realized, so that there is one actual kind that 
satisfies the definition.  A different approach a realist might take is that the description 
does not define the term ‘phonological word’, but is intended to be a reference-fixer, so 
that if the theory is uniquely realized it fixes the reference of the term to the actual 
kind.  If we regard linguistic entities as structures, then a realist would say that the 
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that linguistic entities are functional, but only as a device for being clear as to 
which entities we are referring to by a given term. 
T PU , of course, is not the only theory in which “words” show up.  Each 
linguistic component has its own theory, and there are also theories that 
consist of the conjunction of the theories of individual components.  What is 
the relation among the “words” across these theories, except that we happen 
to use the word ‘word’ to refer to some kind in many of them? 
Below, I will speak of some pressures in the design of multi-component 
systems for what I will call their “ontological matching” across components.  
For the moment, I will leave the idea intuitive, that among the kinds playing a 
role in a component of the language faculty, some are “wordlike,” either 
structurally or extensionally closely matching the intuitive notion of a word.20  
For notational simplicity, I will intuitively define the function W on a theory 
as one that chooses this word-like kind from those entities playing a role in 
the theory.  If we take linguistic kinds to be defined implicitly in a theory, 
then the W function is simply (8) with an appropriate choice of the index i.  
structural description given in a true theory gives the definition of the theoretical term.  
An anti-realist might agree that the structural description gives the definition of the 
theoretical term, but deny that there is a true theory.  Even among the realists, this 
approach also leaves it open what the metaphysics of linguistic entities is, and in 
particular whether the entities are psychological or the objects of a nonpsychological 
but linguistic ontology. 
My own view is that a quasi-realist picture of these entities is the right direction to go in, 
that is that linguistic entities are real kinds to the extent that any entities in the special 
sciences are.  Some are individuated strictly in terms of internal factors, some strictly 
externally, but most have a mix of individuating factors.  This is the case for most 
special sciences, and in this respect the entities of linguistics are not particularly 
exceptional.  All that is neither here nor there, for the purposes of the discussion in this 
paper. 
20 For any given component, there may be more than one wordlike kind, and there clearly 
may also be components that do not make use of any wordlike kinds.  For our 
purposes, however, we will suppose there not to be multiple wordlike kinds in a given 
component, but rather just a single one that plays a dominant role in it, and from the 
discussion above, at least for the components under consideration, each does have at 
least one wordlike kind playing a role in it. 
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Thus in the case of the theory of phonological universals, 



T PUW  is the 
phonological word.  There will be similar characterizations given theories of 
the syntax and morphology components, and potentially the lexicon. 
Let us now consider a range of theories of the idiolect of a particular 
speaker, call her ‘Martha’.  When we construct theory T PU  for Martha, it is 
meant to be a theory of that particular speaker’s phonological component.  As 
long as we are defining the linguistic kinds determined by Martha’s idiolect, 
however, we should also notice that the entities playing a role in theories of 
the universals of Martha’s idiolect are not the only, or even the most intuitive, 
sorts of phonological, syntactic, and other entities that play a role in her 
idiolect altogether. 
When we speak of linguistic entities, we tend to focus on the structures 
that figure into theories of linguistic universals.  In constructing a linguistic 
theory of Martha’s phonological component, for instance, our typical intent is 
to construct a theory of the generic phonological component, of which 
Martha’s particular phonological component, with her parameters set as they 
are, is an instance.  But the most natural systematization of Martha’s own 
idiolect is the one that does not abstract away Martha’s parameter settings, 
but rather gives a theory of her full-blooded idiolect, parameters set as they 
are.  In developing theories of the structures of universal grammar, of course, 
we assume that we can reasonably hypothesize about the genus, of which 
each of our full-blooded idiolects is a species, and use the species data to infer 
the constraints on the structure of the genus.  Still, we should note that a true 
theory of a full-blooded idiolect will involve its own theoretical terms, which 
will be implicitly designated in more detailed theories.  There thus is more 
than one theory even of Martha’s phonological component, morphological 
component, and so on, corresponding to which there is more than one kind of 
phonological word, morphological word, and so on.  The reason I mention 
this is that to make sense of the claims of matches and mismatches of words 
across components, it will not only be the universals that are relevant, but the 
matches once the parameters are set as well.  In fact, it will be the latter that I 
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will focus the bulk of my attention on. 
I will use the following notation for good theories of Martha’s 
phonological universals, morphological universals, syntactic universals, and 
so on.21 
(9a) ,...,, TTT SUMUPU  
A full theory of Martha’s idiolect, as I mentioned, will consist of more 
than a theory of her universals, but includes her parameter settings as well.  
Presuming some variety of the principle-parameters approach is correct, then 
for any component b of her language faculty, there are values to which 
Martha’s b-parameters are set, the theory of which I will notate as: 
(9b) T bV  
Thus any component has a theory combining the principles and 
parameters, which I’ll notate as: 
(9c) TTT bVbUbI ∪=  
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified architecture of Martha’s language faculty, 
with the top row of boxes representing the universal structures of her 
morphology, syntax, and phonology components, and the bottom row of 
boxes represent the components including both the universals and their 
parameter settings. 
The entities implicitly characterized in good theories of these 
components, i.e., those obtained by constructing Ramsey-Lewis sentences 
with the theories listed in (9a) and (9c), are the ones labeled as “universal” 
and “idiolectal” entities, within the respective components. 
21 I.e., true theories that relatively completely capture the functional characteristics of the 
components.  For these purposes, I will assume that existing linguistic theories are 
close to good ones in this sense. 
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System-constrained entities 
One of the key complexities in designating linguistic entities arises from 
the fact that the language faculty, as depicted in figure 1, consists of 
components that are connected to one another.  This means that an adequate 
theory of some component is not really a theory of the component itself.  
Rather, it is a theory of the component as constrained by the components that 
figure into the inputs to that component.  This is a general characteristic of 
theories of modules in multi-part systems, and appreciating it helps clarify 
what exactly the quasi-natural entities are that we refer to in linguistic 
theorizing.  It becomes particularly illuminating when we apply it to multi-
part systems when we already have a theory of a component as isolated from 
the system.  The “internal/external” linguistic system will be such an 
example. 
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To point this out, let us consider three different ways we can depict the 
components of Martha’s language faculty.  First is to consider the simplified 
language architecture depicted in figure 1, but without the connections among 
the components.  That is, let us imagine that the various components were 
treated as isolated from one another.  If we constructed theories of the 
isolated components, then we would only theorize about the characteristics 
and implied entities within each component. 
 
The component in isolation, i.e., with properties resulting from its internal 
structure rather than including the systematic constraints imposed by other 
elements of the system, I denote with B (absent a bar).  Likewise a theory of a 
component in isolation is T without a bar.  In the diagram, a division is again 
made between the universal and idiolectal aspects of the components, 
depicted in the top and bottom rows.  For each module, the idiolectal 
component is the universal component with parameters set. 
When the components are combined into a system, however, there is a 
change in a good theory of the syntax and phonology components.  The 
theory of the universal syntactic component in isolation, T SU , is not the same 
as the syntactic component as it occurs in Martha’s language faculty, i.e., as 
constrained by the inputs from the morphology component. 
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Figure 2b, which corresponds to the depiction in figure 1, incorporates the 
constraints on components imposed by the other components in the language 
faculty.  Given a theory T SU  of the syntactic component in isolation, together 
with the theory T MU  of the morphological component and the theory T SMU   
of the connection between BMU  and BSU , these suffice to determine the 
theory of the constrained universal syntactic component.  This I have notated 
in the diagram as: TTTT SUSMMUSU ∪∪← det .22  Likewise, the structures 
that will occur in the phonology component will be constrained by the 
structures of the syntax component and the syntax-phonology interface. 
In a moment, I will point out why the typical linguistic theory is a theory 
of the constrained component B , rather than the isolated component B.  But 
let us also consider a third way of describing Martha’s language faculty.  This 
is actually the most natural way to treat describe it, but interestingly it is not 
the focus of linguistic theories.  If we suppose that Martha is a competent 
22 It may be useful to think of a different modular system as an analogy, such as a mill 
and a bakery, or a CD player and a graphic equalizer.  A good theory of a particular 
bakery, and the entities and kinds within it, will depend on whether it is treated in 
isolation, or whether it is connected to a corn mill or a rye mill or a wheat mill. 
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speaker, then the natural system for describing Martha’s language faculty is 
to incorporate the constraints imposed by her actual lexicon on the other 
components: 
 
For each of the components, there is a set of quasi-natural entities that 
occur in that component, and that are designated in theories of the 
components.  Figure 2c is plausibly the most intuitive theory of Martha’s 
idiolect, because the most obvious kinds of linguistic entities are just the 
kinds of actual items in Martha’s idiolect, fully constrained by her lexicon 
and everything else in her language faculty.  That is, the obvious kinds of 
linguistic entities in Martha’s idiolect are her actual morphemes, actual 
phonemes, actual phonological words, and so on.  By the “actual” ones, I do 
not mean the tokens that occur in performance, but rather those that simply 
are the morphemes, phonological words, and so on, in her actual idiolect as it 
is, with not only the parameters set, but her actual lexicon in place.  These are 
the entities constrained by Martha’s actual lexicon, as well as all the 
constraints imposed by the structures of the components that provide input to 
her morphology, syntax, and phonology components.  They are the sorts of 
entities we refer to most commonly when saying, for instance, that Martha 
has a forty thousand word vocabulary.  I will call these entities her “idiolectal 
actual” (IA) entities. 
But though they are less obvious, the quasi-natural entities of the 
components depicted in 2b are theoretically more useful.  (I will call these 
components, which I have notated as B , “system-constrained” components.)  
These entities are most properly what we seem to mean when we speak of the 
“possible words,” or “possible intonational phrases,” etc., of an idiolect, or of 
human language altogether.  The phonological words that are “possible” for 
human language, for instance, consist of those that satisfy the universals of 
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the phonology component as well as the universals of the constraints on the 
phonology component imposed by the other components.  And the 
phonological words that are possible for Martha include those that do not 
violate her universals and parameter settings for her phonology component 
and its input constraints, even though they do not appear in her lexicon.23  I 
will call these entities the “universal system-constrained” (UC) entities, and 
the “idiolectal system-constrained” (IC) entities. 
To illustrate the distinction between actual and possible words most 
clearly, it might have been preferable to use a slightly less simplified model 
of the language faculty, which captures the constraints imposed by 
phonological structures on derivational morphology.  In a model that captured 
this, then the IC-words are the ones we speak of when we say that 
jabberwocky, brillig, slithy, and toves are possible English words, while 
bbrjwckaeoy is not.  The violation, ruling these out, is a phonological one 
pertaining to the “sonority hierarchy,” and so even if they are not ruled out by 
morphological structures, the inputs to the derivational morphology 
component rule them out as possible outputs.  For an idiolect, the IC-words 
are thus intuitively the “possible” words in a component, and as for the ones 
that might appropriately be counted as possible in any human language, it is 
the UC-words that seem to be the right ones. 24 
The standalone entities are just the entities that occur in the components 
in isolation, unconstrained by the other components in the linguistic 
architecture as a whole.  These I will call the “universal standalone” and 
“idiolectal standalone” (IS) entities.  In a weak sense, an IS-phonological-
word, for instance, is a “possible” word, given the structure of the 
phonological component alone.  Nonetheless, it is a broader kind than what 
we would normally consider the “possible” ones.  There are many tokens that 
23 This account is somewhat more complicated if the lexicon is structured. 
24 In the first component in a chain, there is no distinction between standalone and 
system-constrained entities, which is the reason that in the simplified architecture in 
figure 2, the US and IS entities in the morphology component are also UC and IC 
entities. 
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would satisfy the conditions given by the characterization of )(T PIW  that 
nonetheless could not be part of the idiolect; not because they do not happen 
to be lexical items, but because they are ruled out by the structures of the 
preceding components.  Thus in order to pick out the intuitively “possible” 
phonological words in Martha’s idiolect, we ought to choose the idiolectal 
system-constrained (IC) phonological words.  These are different from the 
actual (IA) phonological words, constrained by Martha’s lexicon, but are 
more constrained than just what is determined by the structure of her 
phonological component alone. 
For any component of the language faculty, such as morphology or 
phonology or syntax, there are five kinds of entities: universal standalone 
(Type US); universal system-constrained (Type UC); idiolectal standalone 
(Type IS); idiolectal system-constrained (Type IC); and idiolectal actual 
(Type IA).  Figure 3 is a depiction of the simplified linguistic architecture 
from figure 1, but now including all the entities that are implicitly determined 
by their being constrained by the elements the system that feed into them.25 
25 For simplicity, I have left out the theories of the connections between the components.  
A more sophisticated diagram would include bidirectional arrows, and a less simplified 
architecture for the system as a whole. 
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With this, we have at least a baker’s dozen theoretically characterized 
kinds that might count as different varieties of words.  This is the thing about 
quasi-natural entities in the special sciences: there are lots of them.  If we 
wish to take an anti-realist metaphysics of these, then there will be no trouble 
postulating a plenum of potential such entities, but then we have the task of 
accounting for which ones are salient to linguistic theory and why, and as far 
as I can tell, this is parallel to the realist’s task of accounting for what the 
properties of the sparser (but still numerous) set of real entities is, in a 
particular domain. 
3. The idea of ontological matching across components 
Simply introducing an operator to pick out the most wordlike kinds in 
different components does not, of course, mean that the kinds selected have 
anything to do with one another.  If we were arbitrarily to choose a few 
separate domains of inquiry, construct theories of them, and then choose the 
most “wordlike” entities among the domains, then we would not expect there 
to be much resemblance among these entities.  With linguistic components, 
however, the phenomenon is quite the opposite.  In the first section I 
concentrated on pointing out that the word-kinds in each of the various 
components are not the same: the syntactic word is almost but not exactly the 
same as the morphological word, and both are almost but not exactly the 
same as the phonological word.  That the kinds are mismatched is striking.  
But it shouldn’t be overlooked that to the largest extent, they do match across 
components. 
A few paragraphs back, for instance, in introducing IC-words with the 
jabberwocky example, I glossed over whether I was speaking of 
morphological or syntactic or phonological IC-words.  The reason is that here 
there was no need to distinguish among them.  Bbrjwckaeoy is not a possible 
word in any of these components, even though I argued above that the word-
kinds across components are not extensionally equivalent to one another.  The 
possibility of mismatch among the word-kinds only highlights the fact that 
there is a nearly perfect match of these kinds across the components, in spite 
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of the fact that the match is not entirely perfect.  How and why are entities or 
kinds in one component coordinated with those in another?  It is conceivable 
that it is simply an accident, but this seems unlikely.  This is what we might 
call the problem of “ontological matching” among linguistic components. 
Interestingly, the phenomenon of ontological matching it is far from 
unique to linguistics, and in fact is a distinctive but common characteristic of 
multi-component systems.  In considering how inter-component coordination 
can occur, I hope to shed some light on the interaction between other kinds of 
coordinations, such as between internal and external entities, and thus on the 
role of external entities in certain linguistic explanations. 
The box-wire system 
To clarify the idea of ontological matching, let us consider a simplified 
system.  Below I will use this system as a model for discussing internal and 
external linguistic entities, but first let us consider how ontological matching 
can arise through the design of a pair of components to perform a function in 
coordination with one another. 
Consider a box, capable of producing and receiving electrical signals, and 
having some internal structure.  The box generates and accepts electrical 
signals, and let us suppose that the medium through which the signals are 
transmitted is just a wire consisting of three different lengths having different 
gauges.  The wire we connect both to the output and the input of the box. 
 
Suppose we design the box and arrange the wires so that the box can send 
signals to itself and detect them as rapidly as possible.  But suppose that the 
wires are unfortunately a bit thin and sensitive for the signal the box sends 
through it.  The box is capable of sending, say, four different levels of 
current, from 50V to 200V, as well as sending no current at all, at a time.  If 
box
wire
+ -
Fig. 4
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the voltages get too high, though, or if the voltages vary too rapidly from low 
voltages to high ones, the wire heats up, and its signal transmission becomes 
unreliable.  And if a 200V signal is sent at all, the wire burns out entirely. 
For the box to transmit information through the wire successfully at all, to 
say nothing of doing it well, the wire medium and its arrangement impose 
many constraints on the structure of the box.  From the box’s perspective, it 
would use all available current levels, switching them on and off as rapidly as 
it could, to maximize the amount of information transmitted.  But the 
structure of the wire dictates that the highest state never be used, and also that 
there is a bias for using the lower states, as well as a bias against changing 
among the states too often.  Thus for the system to be able to transmit 
information at all, there are constraints imposed on the design of the box, and 
if there are pressures for it be designed with the function of transmitting 
information efficiently, there are competing considerations that need to be 
balanced. 
So let us suppose that a clever designer has assembled the internals of the 
box and the arrangement of the wire, so as to do a good job at optimizing how 
the box sends signals to itself through the wire.  The wire component (call it 
BW), let us suppose, is arranged in order as heavy to medium to fine gauge.  
And the box component (BX) has a complex internal structure. 
First consider the components designed as they are, treated in isolation 
from one another.  For each, we can construct a theory of the isolated 
component, TW and TX respectively.  These respective theories will each refer 
to different quasi-natural kinds and entities.  In the theory of the wire we 
might refer to the gauge and composition of the wires, and also the generic 
electrical properties of the wire component, relating such variables as the 
level, duration, and volatility of current flowing through the wire to the 
temperature of the wire.  One quasi-natural kind referred to in TW might be a 
generic burst or signal or packet of current flowing through the wire.  This 
could for instance be characterized in the theory as: a relatively steady 
voltage with some fixed duration, and having a substantial change in voltage 
to a relatively steady level before and after. 
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Theorizing about the box in isolation, we would have a very different set 
of quasi-natural kinds and entities.  The box might have switches and 
counters, inputs and outputs, levels of transmission, and levels of detection.  
In theorizing about the electrical properties of the box in isolation, it might 
also have its own quasi-natural burst or signal or packet corresponding to the 
natural discrete bursts of current that flowing through the box. 
As with the linguistic case, we can thus depict the components of the box-
wire system as isolated from one another, and list the quasi-natural entities 
referred to in good theories of these components: 
 
The entities referred to in TW and TX are S-entities, i.e. determined strictly 
by the characteristics of the wire and box taken as isolated components.  As 
with the linguistic system, however, when we consider the system connected 
together, a different set of entities will be the natural ones that we will discern 
in the wire and in the box. 
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In the combined system, the theories of the system-constrained box and 
the system-constrained wire are each determined by the theories of the box 
and wire in isolation, together with the bidirectional interfaces between the 
two.  The entities in the box (i.e., the C-entities) will still be the ones that are 
materially constituted strictly within the box, and correspondingly for the 
wire.  But the C-entities that are the quasi-natural ones in the box will not be 
determined by the characteristics of the box alone.  And likewise for the C-
entities in the wire.  When we observe the system as a whole in action, it is 
the C-entities that we observe.  A theory of the current flowing through the 
wire, as connected to the system, will thus look very different from a generic 
theory of current flowing through an identical wire. 
 
In the course of the design of the box-wire system, there is implicit 
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pressure for certain entities across components to match up with one another.  
The system is designed so that it maximizes the amount of information the 
box can transmit to itself.  One thing this means is that the signals that the box 
outputs need to be received by the inputs of the box.  So they cannot 
disappear when sent through the wire, because of noise or burnout or some 
other reason.  That is to say, all the packets sent through and from and to the 
box should correspond to packets sent through the wire.  And all the packets 
sent through the wire should correspond to ones sent through and from and to 
the box.  This pressure is for a correspondence not between the ontologies of 
the box and the wire in isolation, but only for correspondence between their 
ontologies as constrained by the other, in the system in which they are 
connected.  That is to say, there is pressure for the wire-C-packets and the 
box-C-packets to be ontologically coordinated. 
The pressure on the design of the box, in other words, is not for it to be 
structured so as to involve a box-entity that matches an entity that is entirely 
natural to wire ontology.  What is required, instead, is that the box be 
structured so as to involve an entity that matches one that can be entirely 
constituted by structures in the wire when constrained by the system as a 
whole.  It does not matter that the C-packets in the wire seem, from the 
perspective of the theory of wires alone, to be highly gerrymandered entities.  
It also doesn’t matter that there may be mismatches between the C-entities on 
occasion between the two components.  We will find examples of box packets 
that do not count as wire packets, and conversely wire packets that do not 
count as box packets.  This may be an artifact, for instance, of the flakiness of 
the wire, so that noise in the wire sometimes may drown out what voltages 
are output by the box.  Or it may be an artifact of a constraint on the design of 
the box to match what count as packets for it to what count as packets when 
considered within the medium of the wire.  Nonetheless, it is efficient to 
design the box so that when it wants a packet sent from its output to arrive at 
its input, that that packet will be tailored so as to conform to what can be a C-
packet in the wire. 
In the box-wire system, coordination facilitates the efficient functioning 
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of the system.  For the box to ensure that it received the signals it sent, it is 
reasonable to design it so that the box-C-packets match up with the wire-C-
packets.  But what the quasi-natural kinds are in the wire in isolation – that is 
the wire-S-entities – does not particularly matter.  Intuitively, the reason that 
these are the entities coordinated is that the ones that actually show up in the 
components are the C-entities, not the S-entities.  We only need coordination 
in the cases that might actually occur, so it is not only a waste of effort, but is 
less efficient, if we coordinate more generic entities between components 
than the ones that show up given the constraints of the system. 
Likewise, to explain the near-matching of entities across linguistic 
components, it is not the US- or IS-entities that we should expect to be 
coordinated, but the UC-, IC- and/or IA-entities.  The linguistic data on 
varieties of words considered above, such as that essuie-glace is a 
morphological word in French and not a syntactic word, could be understood 
as a claim about morphological and syntactic words of type (IA), i.e., the 
words in Martha’s (or perhaps Pierre’s) actual idiolect, with parameter 
settings and lexicon fixed.  In addition, the data also seems to be evidence 
about the mismatch of the possible or IC-words, i.e., those determined strictly 
by the universals and parameter settings of components of an idiolect.  And it 
can be understood as bearing on the coordination of the universal C-words, 
the constrained universal structures of morphology, syntax, and phonology.  It 
may be either the constrained or the actual entities that there is pressure to 
coordinate;26 but inasmuch as there is pressure on the standalone entities, that 
is a consequence of the pressures on the actual and constrained ones.  If one 
doesn’t distinguish the constrained entities from the standalone ones, then 
there is a strong risk she will overlook the fact of ontological matching 
altogether.  As I will discuss, this is a key source of confusion in discerning 
the role of external words in linguistic explanation. 
26 There may in fact be reason to expect that it is the IA entities that are coordinated 
between components, not the IC entities.  That’s something that we can empirically 
test: that there is better IA matching than IC matching.  The way we do that is to 
compare the matching soon after acquisition, or words acquired earlier and later. 
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4. Ontological matching across linguistic components 
There are interesting similarities between the notion of ontological 
matching across linguistic components and the idea of “edge alignment” in 
recent work on the interface between morphology and phonology.  The 
approach I will suggest, however, is quite different from that implicitly 
advocated in current treatments of edge alignment.  In current theories, 
alignment is treated as an active constraint that acts across components.  I will 
suggest, in contrast, that the coordination of linguistic components can be 
understood as arising from mutual pressures in the initial setting of 
parameters, rather than having to postulate ongoing coordination in the active 
generation of grammatical structures. 
To take one example of cross-component alignment, it has long been 
observed that the prosodic structure of a language has an influence on the 
admissible morphological forms in that language.  A variety of theories have 
been proposed to account for the influences of natural prosodic breaking 
points with word boundaries.27  McCarthy and Prince have proposed a very 
generic sort of constraint, which they call “generalized alignment,” that can 
operate within or between components. In optimality theory, constraints are 
prioritized, and act as violable successive filters on which candidate structures 
are determined to be grammatical.28  Generalized alignment constraints are 
any constraints of the form Align(Category 1, Edge 1, Category 2, Edge 2), 
that is, constraints that specify that either the right or left edge of some sort of 
string is aligned with the right or left edge of another sort of string.  A 
particular instance of this might be that the right edge of a suffix is aligned 
with the right edge of a pword.  In the generalized alignment approach, there 
does not have to be simultaneous alignment of both sides of an entity: just 
one edge of an entity can be aligned with an edge of another entity. 
27 Cf. McCarthy and Prince (1993), pp. 80-83. 
28 McCarthy and Prince (1993); McCarthy and Prince (1999). 
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For our purposes, the details are not essential.29  What is relevant is the 
approach to understanding how pressures are applied to the generation of 
grammatical forms that are aligned across components.  Inasmuch as 
alignment constraints are descriptive of the structure of expression 
generation, they operate as active constraints operating across categories, 
involving the simultaneous application of ranked constraints within both 
components.30  McCarthy and Prince propose that generalized alignment is 
the only meeting point between morphology and phonology.  Nonetheless, it 
is a powerful meeting point.  The output of the two components is actively 
coordinated between the two, in narrowing down grammatical outputs.  Thus 
the outputs of the components in their picture (again, so long as the 
description is taken to be of a generative system, rather than simply 
descriptive adequacy of the outputs) are not generated modularly, from one 
component passed on to another, and it effectively takes the components to be 
a single module. 
Rather than being an active constraint on structure formation in the 
language faculty, I will suggest that ontological matching can arise through 
pressures exerted between components in the setting of parameters or 
rankings in an idiolect.  As a characteristic of the interface between 
components, alignment is a violation of modularity.  But if we understand the 
29 One point that may have significant bearing on the issues here, however, is the 
alignment of one edge of an entity without aligning the other edge.  McCarthy and 
Prince provide a number of examples that suggest that alignment phenomena can 
indeed occur with edges independent of one another.  This may have an important 
effect on how we consider what the pressures are for aligning entities across 
components.  I will not focus on this issue, but only notice that one pressure is for word 
alignment across components, whether or not this pressure should be understood as 
two edge-alignment pressures. 
30 In much of optimality theory, it is unclear whether the constraints at work in the 
filtering of candidate forms are meant to describe an overall mathematical structure for 
systematizing grammatical outputs, or whether they are meant to correspond to 
generative systems within the language faculty.  When we consider a cross-component 
constraint, this issue becomes critical, since it raises the issue as to whether linguistic 
components can be treated as independently operating modules, or must be seen as 
acting in coordination in the generation of grammatical structures. 
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setting of parameters or rankings to take place in coordination with common 
pressures, the same outcome can arise through alignment in acquisition, 
rather than through alignment in production. 
Another difference between the treatment of alignment in optimality 
theory and the approach suggested by examining ontological matching relates 
to what is understood as the relevant kind of coordination across components.  
Generalized alignment involves the coordination of the edges of strings with 
one another.  The notion of “ontological matching,” however, at least as it 
appears from the characteristics of words, involves the coincidence of entities 
across components, where the entities are not necessarily strings and the 
coordination does not necessarily involve only edges.31 
The coordination of entities across components through parameter setting 
The treatment of edge-alignment with interface rules has the advantage 
that they are general and globally applicable.  However, it has the 
disadvantage that it is at odds with the modularity of linguistic components.  
Inasmuch as such rules are intended for grammatical description, rather than 
generativity, this is not necessarily a fault.  But if generativity is a 
31 An intuitive understanding of ontological matching is simply as coinciding extensions: 
the phonological and morphological and syntactic words in an idiolect match when 
each consists of the same actual words.  There are two obvious problems with this.  
One is that we can only say loosely that the extension of the phonological word, for 
instance, matches the extension of the syntactic word.  Ivan Sag has rightly mocked the 
image of linguistic entities passing from component to component like salesmen 
carrying locked suitcases.  Jackendoff has emphasized a similar point, in noting that 
the way syntactic trees are typically drawn, with lexical items as the leaves, is 
misleading, as opposed to being structures with slots for lexical items (Jackendoff 
(2002), pp. 121-122).  This is an issue that can be cleared up with a proper 
understanding of the kinds of entities occurring in multi-component systems.  The 
other problem, though, is that even if there is a sense in which a word may be 
understood as a cross-component entity, it is not clear how their extensions are to be 
understood as even potentially matching across components.  In this discussion, I will 
simply leave it at this intuitive level.  In what follows, I will presume that we can make 
sense of inter-component matching, and focus on the question of the matching of IC-
entities, i.e. what explains why the morphological and syntactic and phonological 
words that we intuitively consider Martha’s possible words nearly match with one 
another. 
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consideration in evaluating descriptive approaches, and if linguistic 
components generate grammatical forms modularly, then a constraint 
governing interfaces is a shortcoming.  I will suggest instead that modularity 
can be reconciled with cross-module alignment, through the coordination in 
learning, or the setting of parameters, rather than in generation. 
The generic issue in the case of setting parameters, as is depicted in figure 
8a, is that there are cues received by the language acquirer, which exert 
pressures on how the parameters are set in each linguistic component.  (The 
line with small dots represents design or conformance pressure exerted by 
some factor on a component.)  The question is how, in light of the setting of 
the parameters in conformance to the cueing pressures, the resulting entities 
end up being ontologically aligned with one another.  Again, the entities I 
mean to consider here are the IC-entities across the components.  Martha’s 
possible morphological words, for instance, are aligned with her possible 
syntactic ones, and so with her possible phonological words. 
 
There are several sorts of explanation for the alignment.  One is that it is 
simply accidental, which seems implausible.  This is the solution that would 
be depicted by 8a, if there were no coordination at all between the modules. 
A different solution is to take the cues that set Martha’s parameters or 
constraint rankings to involve morphophonological alignment rules directly.  
This is depicted in 8b: 
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As I mentioned in connection with generalized alignment, however, this 
compromises the modularity of the morphology and phonology components. 
A third solution is that the alignment between modules can be explained 
through mutual pressures or coordination mechanisms in the setting of 
parameters or rankings, without needing to postulate global alignment rules or 
constraints.  Figure 8c depicts the components being mutually influenced or 
coordinated, as a result of influences interacting between them.  Here there 
are pressures leading to the structures of the components being coordinated, 
so that entities that are quasi-natural kinds across those structures are aligned.  
Both of these involve mutual coordination, due to interactive conformance 
pressures of some sort. 
 
If we look at the literature on language acquisition with an eye to 
observing the coordination of components in parameter-setting, we find that it 
is thick with examples.  Slobin (1985), for instance, presents a variety of 
cases of the development of morphological paradigms on phonological 
grounds.  In acquiring gender morphology, children across a wide variety of 
languages employ phonological cues to work out inflectional structure.32 
Evaluation the coordination of parameter-settings across modules 
involves a variety of empirical issues.  The picture requires both that 
linguistic components be modular, so that there is at least reason to doubt that 
expression generation is governed by overarching principles or constraints.  It 
32 Slobin (1985), pp. 1212-1219.  See also, Levy (1983); Pinker (1984); MacWhinney 
(1985). 
Mutual influences, 
“harmonized”
structures
ee
Cues
e eee
morph phonol
Fig. 8c
34 
 
                                                 
also requires that the way that the morphological parameters are set 
influences and is influenced by the way that the phonological ones are, and 
likewise for the syntactic ones.  And moreover, that there are influences in 
parameter setting between components suggests but does not entail that those 
influences involve ontological coordination. 
Still, for there to be an allocation of responsibility and a coordination of 
ontologies between two components, there needs only to be a minimal source 
of pressure exerted between the components.  In all the models, there is 
pressure exerted by the cues to have the parameter settings somehow affected 
by them.  Yet it is reasonable to assume that conformance to the demands of 
the cues, together with the universal structures of the component, are not the 
only constraint on the setting of the parameters, but that there are also overall 
demands, such as to enhance overall pronounceability, augment the efficiency 
of the system as a whole, or reduce energy consumption, or increase 
processing speed.  These crude pressures can account for the generation of 
complex sorts of coordination between components.  This issue has been 
explored in most detail in economic theory, both in the theory of games and 
in the theory of the firm.33  Investigation of similar phenomena as applied to 
cognitive structure is a potentially fertile topic for inquiry. 
The coordination of universals 
In the preceding discussion, I have suggested that a plausible explanation 
for the ontological matching of idiolectal entities, most straightforwardly the 
ones I’ve called IC-entities, is provided by coordination in the setup of the 
components, rather than by happenstance or in virtue simply of the active 
coordination between the components in the generation of grammatical 
forms.  An obvious next step is to ask the same about whether or not there is 
matching of entities determined in the universal structures of various 
33 A generic form of the mutual pressures that affect the components in tandem with one 
another has a relatively straightforward mathematical description, which helps make it 
explicit how they are interdetermined.  This is a topic that has been addressed in the 
study of the pressures influencing the coordination of firms in economic theory, 
notably in the literature sparked by Grossman and Hart (1986). 
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components and seek an explanation for what would account for such 
coordination as well.  The obvious source of potential coordination among 
these is natural selection, acting as a pressure on the design of the universal 
structures of various components in tandem with one another, as opposed to 
exerting pressure on each component entirely independent of one another.  
The coordination of multi-component systems by natural selection is again a 
common but as far as I know relatively unexplored phenomenon. 
The viability of this explanation, of course, depends on the question of the 
evolution of the language faculty altogether.  The sorts of linguistic data on 
words I presented above can, I believe, serve as evidence for the ontological 
matching of universals across components as well as for the coordination of 
parameter-setting across components.  Furthermore, it may be reasonable 
even to take these phenomena as some evidence for a selection account of 
linguistic universals, as I mentioned. 
Nevertheless, rather than examining universals I want to turn instead to 
the coordination of internal and external entities; that is, of certain I-word 
kinds with certain E-word kinds.  Again, I am less concerned with proposing 
a metaphysics of these entities than with bringing into relief their role in 
linguistic explanation, so as to counter the claim that they are irrelevant to 
linguistics.  To do so, I want to “flatten out” the distinction between the 
multiple components of the language faculty and the physiological apparatus 
for the production and reception of language and the external manifestations 
of language, including sounds, inscriptions, and the media in which they 
occur. 
5. External entities in linguistic explanation 
Ludlow points out in Philosophical Issues in Generative Linguistics that 
“relational sciences,” i.e., sciences involving the relation between individuals 
and the environment, are not entirely irrelevant to building theories in 
“individualistic sciences”: 
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The general phenomenon of individualistic and relational 
sciences informing each other is fairly common.  One 
example I drew on [in previous work] was the contrast 
between primate physiology and primate ecology, in which 
the former draws upon individualistic facts about (for 
example the skeletal structure of the primate) and the latter 
addresses relations between the primate and its environment.  
Despite the apparently distinct properties under investigation, 
it is possible for facts about primate physiology to support a 
particular claim about the relation of the primate to its 
environment and vice versa…My favorite illustration of the 
general phenomenon remains Webster and Webster (1988), in 
which it is observed that individualistic anatomical structure 
can place constraints on the types of (relational) 
environmental functions that are possible, and vice versa.34 
Chomsky (1995) likewise affirms that relational and individualistic 
sciences can inform each other.  A study of the human breathing cycle, for 
instance, may involve the exchange of oxygen with the atmosphere. 
Both of these, however, are raised mainly to draw the distinction between 
the investigation of internal from environmental factors, rather than to explore 
a role for the environment in linguistic investigation.  It is left unclear, for 
instance, whether there is then a relational science that informs linguistics, as 
primate ecology does for primate physiology.  Moreover, these points are not 
accompanied by an acknowledgement of the potential relevance or even 
coherence of external linguistic entities. 
Applying the relations between words in various internal components of 
the language faculty to the internal/external divide, we can make significant 
headway in clearing up the candidates for what we are referring to in 
speaking of external words as well.  Clarifying the similarity between the 
external candidates and the internal ones makes it clear that it is rash to deny 
34 Ludlow (2007), Ch. 4. 
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the coherence of external linguistic entities outright, and also to deny their 
role in linguistic explanation. 
Once again, here I am not considering the design of linguistic universals 
in response to external constraints.  To vindicate the role of external entities 
in linguistic explanation we can stick to the setting of parameters with cues. 
Matching internal and external words 
In the discussion of the box-wire system, I treated both box and wire as 
analogous to components of the language faculty.  However, it is 
straightforward to see that the wire is even more closely analogous to the 
acoustic environment in which verbal signals are communicated from a 
speaker to herself and between speakers. 
 
Figure 9 depicts the system of Martha’s language faculty as a whole 
connected to the external physical environment, as the box was connected to 
the wire.  Martha’s language faculty is here taken as a unit, and in isolation is 
denoted by ‘BL’, with TL being a good theory of BL.  BA is the relevant 
external environment – principally, the physical characteristics of the air 
through which vocalizations are transmitted – and TA is a good theory of BA in 
isolation. 
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TA in isolation is the theory of acoustics.  Acoustics has as its subject 
matter the transmission of sounds in the air in general, and there are many 
quasi-natural entities in acoustics, arising from the sound-transmission 
properties of the air and physical structures alone.  A good theory of acoustics 
will involve terms for such kinds and properties as sound waves, pitch, 
duration, amplitude, etc.  On the other hand, from the perspective of acoustic 
theory, words are not likely to be particularly natural entities at all, just as the 
timbre of a Stradivarius is not quasi-natural to acoustic theory alone, but only 
to acoustic theory in combination with Stradivarii. 
In considering the physical environment from the perspective of 
linguistics, however, we are not principally concerned with S-entities of the 
physical environment.  Rather, the relevant quasi-natural kinds are the C-
entities of the environment in combination with the language faculties of 
individuals.  It should be no surprise that acoustic theorists have a difficult 
time generating strictly acoustic criteria for word-hood.  From the perspective 
of acoustic theory – that is, a theory of BA alone – words are highly 
gerrymandered entities.  But in a theory of the system – that is a theory of 
{ }LAALAL BBBB  ,,,  – they will be among the most natural of entities. 
As in the other multi-component systems, presuming at least some design 
pressures on the system as a whole, we should expect that any matching 
across the components should be between the C-entities.  It is not difficult to 
see, as in the case of the box, what the functional utility is of a match between 
Martha’s C-words (i.e. )( LTW ) and the external C-words (i.e. )( ATW ).  
Even if we consider only Martha’s babbling to herself, rather than her 
communicating with a linguistic community, she babbles efficiently to herself 
just in case the tokens of the C-words in the environment occur when she has 
tokens of C-words in her head. 
For this coordination to take place, it is not necessary to adapt both the 
physical environment and her language faculty in the design process.  Rather, 
we can take the physical environment for granted, and take her language 
faculty to have been designed so as to accommodate those fixed 
39 
 
characteristics.35  In other words, the component BL, and the resulting quasi-
natural entities Di(TL), were designed, in conformance with the strictures 
imposed by BL’s being in an environment having structure BA.  However, that 
does not imply that BA understood as isolated (or the entities Di(TA) ) are what 
is salient to the explanation of the design of BL.  If we are to understand the 
problem of the design of BL as an optimization problem, it is the coordination 
of )( LTW  with )( ATW  that is relevant.  That coordination problem can only 
be expressed by considering the ontology of the system as a unit, rather than 
considering the language faculty to be directed by the characteristics of 
acoustic entities treated in isolation.  Only once the component BL has been 
designed, through pressures coordinating the C-entities of the system, then 
the internal “anatomy” of BL is determined, and we can theorize about BL in 
isolation.  
This is what we described with the box-wire design.  In the box-wire 
case, it was mostly the box that was designed, rather than the wire.  The 
designer of the system was able to modify the arrangement of the segments of 
wire, but mostly the wire presented a fixed set of characteristics that the 
design of the box had to accommodate.  This does not, however, imply that 
the only wire-entities about which to theorize are its S-entities.  In 
constructing a theory of the wire, it is true that we are naturally inclined to 
consider it in isolation.  But from the perspective of the box-wire system 
together, the wire-S-entities are not the natural external ones.  Instead, it is the 
wire-C-entities, i.e., the entities that are determined by the system as a whole, 
albeit whose tokens are materially constituted entirely in the wire, that are the 
quasi-natural external ones in box-wire theory. 
Even in the study of the anatomy of the box or of the language faculty, it 
may not be possible or desirable to ignore the C-entities.  If we had perfect 
visibility into the internals of the box, we might be able to characterize its 
structure, i.e., to construct a good theory TX, simply from the observation of 
35 Remember that here we are taking the “design” of her language faculty to include the 
setting of her parameters, not just the adaptation of her biological structures. 
40 
 
                                                 
the box alone independent of its environment.  But if there are any limitations 
at all to the data we have about the structure of the box, or even if the box is 
reasonably complex, then considering XT  may be indispensable for 
generating an acceptable TX.  After all, at least part of the explanation for why 
the box-S-entities being what they are is derivative on the characteristics of 
the box-C-entities.  If there are, for instance, simplicity or elegance or 
nonredundancy considerations applied to generating hypotheses about the 
structure of S-entities, then what these are properly applied to is the simplicity 
or elegance or nonredundancy of various box-internal solutions to the 
ontological matching problem between cross-component C-entities. 
Given the almost complete opacity of the language faculty to direct 
inquiry, these sorts of considerations play an enormous role in linguistic 
theorizing.  It is thus very implausible that there are such informative data-
sources on the structure of the language faculty as the external factors that 
figure into the way parameters are set, and yet that these external factors will 
be outside the scope of linguistic explanation. 
What E-words are 
Although there are many possible candidates for what the term ‘word’ 
can refer to, that is an argument for disambiguation, not for the denial of the 
coherence of one notion or another.  E-words are no more problematic from 
this perspective than the various candidates for I-words, or I-morphemes or I-
phonemes.  In every domain, we can identify the most “word-like” entities, 
but it must be admitted that the entities picked out will not be particularly 
natural in certain domains, such as acoustic theory taking in isolation.36  
Nonetheless, there are at least two excellent candidates for E-words 
identifiable in the Martha-physical system.  One is the physical-C-words, 
36 Also, in domains where it is not particularly natural, there are likely to be many 
candidates that are basically equally good.  It is as important a condition for being the 
clear referent of a theoretical term that it be the unique near-realizer of the Ramsey-
Lewis description as that it be quasi-natural, though these two conditions are 
interrelated. 
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which are entirely materially constituted by sound waves, but are constrained 
by the structure of Martha’s language faculty.  These entities do have physical 
regularities, but not ones that the science of acoustics will easily discern, in 
the absence of considering the speakers as well.  Given that they are 
materially constituted entirely externally, we can characterize these things in 
strictly external terms.  That is, we can construct a theory of physical-C-
words in entirely acoustic terms.  But we should expect that this theory will 
look highly gerrymandered from the perspective of general acoustic theory. 
A second candidate for what we might call an E-word is the quasi-natural 
word-like entity arising from the system as a whole, including both Martha 
and the environment.  That is, the entity designated by 
( )LAALAL TTTTW  ∪∪∪ .  This is an entity I have not highlighted in 
the various diagrams.  Nonetheless it is reasonable to think that there will be a 
quasi-natural entity in the system as a whole, which closely matches both the 
Martha-C-words and the physical-C-words, yet is more quasi-natural than 
either when considering the system as a whole.  Since the Martha-physical 
system includes Martha as a component, this entity might with equal justice 
be called an I-word as an E-word.  Yet it is plausibly the intuitive entity that 
is instantiated both internally and externally, and hence that magically seems 
to cross boundaries between mind and world. 
Notice that, however we understand E-words, they will likely not be 
perfectly matched with any of the dozen kinds of I-words in Martha’s 
idiolect.  Martha’s parameters are set in part so as to match Martha-C-words 
with physical-C-words, but that design does not demand perfection.  It is a 
fallacious argument against E-words to point out examples of sound-patterns 
that cannot be mapped one-to-one with I-words of some kind. 
Finally, notice that the notion of an E-word does not depend so far on the 
publicity of language.  The candidate E-words I have discussed only involve 
Martha and the environment, not a community of speakers.  The approach I 
have presented, however, does indicate how we can begin to understand the 
individuation of public linguistic entities.  If we consider a system of two 
people in an environment, then it is clear how they compose a system, with its 
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own sets of S- and C-entities, and a similar story can be constructed about the 
coordination of C-entities of all the components in that more complex system.  
The idea that we can speak of coherent E-words for a community depends on 
the question as to whether there is a tendency for various C-entities to match 
across the system as a whole.  But our ability to communicate with one 
another strongly suggests that there is pressure for the ontological alignment 
of the C-entities within a community, where the community is considered as 
the system. 
In considering the roles of various entities in linguistic explanation, it is 
helpful to worry about the internal/external distinction a little less, and instead 
notice that there are many ways of carving out multi-part systems along 
appropriately natural boundaries.  Moreover, if there is any cunning to the 
history of scientific inquiry, it is to slap down those who arbitrarily stipulate 
that some domain of entities is not pertinent to explanations in a scientific 
field.  This was the strong lesson that linguists have taken from the abortive 
exclusion of internal properties of the mind in early-century empiricism.  It is 
equally clear, I believe, that in future linguistic investigation we are bound to 
find it an overreaction to have denied the reality of external linguistic entities 
or their pertinence to linguistic explanation. 
All the discussion above is of course complicated by the fact that there 
are no perfectly definite boundaries between components of any kind.  It has 
been repeatedly pointed out that the notion that the language faculty is a 
series of independent components, acting only through interfaces, is a rather 
gross simplification, whether the components are physically or even 
functionally delineated.  Inasmuch as the functional structure of the language 
faculty can be treated as consisting of components, there are places where it is 
most plausible to regard them as “interpenetrated.”  But the same is of course 
true of the boundaries between internal and external.  As far as I can tell, this 
complication only breaks down further the pull to exclude the external from 
the direction in which linguistic theory is bound to be headed. 
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